Contraryto Wilsonian dogma, military occupation of a foreign country, whether the natives are Arabs, Eskimos, Japanese or Finns, is not a difficult problem. The reason the US is finding it impossible to occupy Iraq is that its own domestic political system has made it impossible.

Here's what you would have to do to successfully occupy Iraq, Lord Cromer style. Establish an Iraqi government whose employees are Iraqis and whose executives are internationals. Establish an Iraqi army whose officers are Americans and whose soldiers are Iraqis. Suppress all political parties, mafias, militias, etc, hanging as many people as necessary. Set up a transition plan which involves handing over a stabilized Iraq to a real ruler, probably a Gulf prince. Better yet, split the country into emirates and pick a Gulf prince for each. It's not like there is some great shortage of Gulf princes.

The irony is that Lord Cromer's advice would be exactly the same as George Cochran's: get the hell out. Because you can't do any of this.  Why is an effective program of colonial administration impossible? Why can'tthe US military turn Iraq into a civilized country? Because of Americans who'd whine about Iraqi "human rights."

In reality, those Americans don't give a flying crap about Iraq orIraqis. We saw how much they cared about Vietnamese human rights in 1975. Their real motivation is the same one held by pretty much everyone in politics: defeating their real enemy. In this case, the US military, which they hate like poison. (I live in San Francisco. Don't try to tell me I'm wrong about this.)

The US military's error in Iraq, in Vietnam, and even in Korea, was to think that it could win a domestic political victory by winning a foreign military victory. Its enemies were on to that game. There was no way they would let it happen. After all, the result would be jingoistic imperialism Disraeli style.

Staging these civil wars by proxy in these pissant nowhere countries is a waste of time, money and lives. If the US military wants to take over Washington, it should grow a pair and do it the old-fashioned way.

But I don't think borrowing Noam Chomsky's talking points is an effective way to understand this situation. The Iraq disaster can onlybe understood as a continuation of the postcolonial disaster, and the postcolonial disaster can only be understood by understanding colonialism.

And no one who understood colonialism would ever suggest that colonialism couldn't possibly work. In fact, it worked quite well. (Until people started trying to turn it into postcolonialism.)

Jihadis fight for power and glory. I could add money, but I don't think this is relevant to most jihadis, although (if you believe Omar Nasiri) it certainly is for some.

Note how critical the prospect of victory is for all of these. There is certainly no money or power without victory. There may be some glory, but only in a pathetic kind of way that doesn't much appeal to the Arab soul, or any soul for that matter.

Even the kamikazes, who are the most recent equivalent of suicide bombers, were sent off with a narrative of how their actions would cause Imperial Japan to win the war, or at least survive it. It was not a very plausible narrative, but it did the trick.

Notice that despite the well-known fanaticism of the Japanese, which certainly at least approached the Palestinian level, all resistance in Japan, as in Germany, ceased upon occupation. Why was this? Read JCS 1067 for a clue. Why was there no Confederate insurgency? Check out the Lieber code, and look at the tactics the Union used when insurgency was tried.

Finally, read Trinquier and Luttwak on modern war and counterinsurgency. Are you saying these gentlemen don't know what they're talking about, either?